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Employer's Liability for Employee He Was
Compelled to Hire
James Balph*
T IS WELL SETTLED at common law that the master stands liable for
damage and injuries to third persons resulting from the torts of his
servant within the course and scope of his employment.' This principle
results from the agency doctrine of respondeat superior which imputes
liability to the master for breach of duty to third persons by the servant.2
Two aspects of this principle affect the subject matter of this
paper. The first one is that a master generally will be held liable for
injuries inflicted upon third persons by his servant when the master
was negligent in failing to select a servant who was competent or fit
for the job.3 The second one is that no liability will accrue under the
doctrine of respondeat superior unless there exists at the time of the
injury a relationship of master and servant between the person who
committed the wrongful act and the employer. 4 The courts look to the
facts of each case in determining whether or not the persons involved
occupy the relationship of master and servant.5 However, the right to
direct and control the performance of the alleged servant is a neces-
sary element.6 This essential control must be complete and unqualified,
and it must extend both to the result to be accomplished and to the
manner and details of the performance of the work.7 Another pre-
requisite to the finding of the relationship is the master's right to choose
and select the servant."
In view of these master-servant elements, should an employer be
liable for the torts of his employee if he was compelled to employ him?
The master is charged with the obligation of selecting competent work-
* B.S., Northwestern Univ.; M.B.A., Univ. of Pittsburgh; Manager-Labor Relations,
the Glidden Co., Cleveland, Ohio; Fourth-year Student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Mirabel & Levy, Negligence 238 (1962); 1 Encyc. of Negligence 742 (1962); Prosser,
Torts 490 (3d ed. 1964).
2 Clewell v. Pummer, 384 Pa. 515, 121 A.2d 459 (1956); Fleming, Torts, 455 (3d ed.
1965); Hulke v. International Mfg. Co., 14 Ill.App.2d 5, 142 N.E.2d 717 (1957).
3 Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 566, 46 N.W.2d 382 (1951); Grant v. Knepper, 245
N.Y. 158, 156 N.E. 650 (1927); Restatement (Second), Agency, Secs. 212-218 (1958).
4 Councell v. Douglas, 163 Ohio St. 292, 126 N.E.2d 597 (1955); Khoury v. Edison
Elec. Illum. Co., 265 Mass. 236, 164 N.E. 77 (1928).
5 Cowan v. Eastern Racing Ass'n., 330 Mass. 135, 111 N.E.2d 752 (1953).
6 Restatement (Second), Agency, Sec. 220(1) (1958); Starego v. Soboliski, 11 N.J. 29,
93 A.2d 169 (1952); Van Drake v. Thomas, 110 Ind. App. 586, 38 N.E.2d 878 (1942).
7 Crum v. Walker, 241 Iowa 1173, 44 N.W.2d 701 (1950); McConnell v. Williams, 361
Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
8 Broadway Motors v. Bass, 252 Ky. 628, 67 S.W.2d 955 (1933); Greaser v. Appaline
Oil Co., 109 W.Va. 396, 155 S.E. 170 (1930); Merlo v. Public Service Co., 381 Ill. 300,
45 N.E.2d 665 (1942).
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men. 9 Therefore, if the element of employee selection is removed as a
prerogative of the employer, does not this remove the master-servant
relationship? If the employer through no fault of his own cannot com-
pletely direct and control the employee, is not the necessary privity be-
tween master and servant absent? Is it reasonable that the employer be
liable for the misconduct of a person whose selection and/or control has
been taken out of his hands? A review of existing case law is required
to answer these questions.
Pilotage Cases
In many states statutes exist which have the legal effect of making
the employment of pilots mandatory in certain instances such as in di-
recting the movements of a ship into or out of a harbor.', These statutes
generally require the ship captain to take on board the first pilot to come
along side his ship before it enters the harbor, and in the event of
refusal the shipowner must nonetheless pay the pilotage fee. In in-
terpreting these statutes, the shipowner is under a legal compulsion to
accept the pilot because the statute imposes a penalty in the event of
refusal.11 It is noteworthy that the shipowner has no choice as to which
pilot he accepts.
In cases arising under these compulsory pilotage statutes, the
principle is well established that no action lies at law against the ship-
owner for damages resulting from the negligence of the pilot who was
compulsorily employed on the vessel.12 A case on this point was de-
cided as early as 1815, Carruthers v. Sydebotham, in which Lord Ellen-
borough determined that there was no agency relationship between the
pilot and shipowner because the shipowner was under compulsion of
the law to take the pilot and place the ship in his hands.13
In actions at law the United States has uniformly followed this
principle. 14 The major decision was the case of Homer Ramsdell Trans-
9 Bradley v. Stevens, supra note 3; Grant v. Knepper, supra note 3.
10 Ala. Code, Tit. 38, Ch. 2, Sec. 82 (1940); Calif. Harbors and Navig. Code, Div. 5,
Ch. 2-4 (1937); Fla. Code, Tit. XXI, Sec. 310.10-.20 (1927); La. Rev. Stat., Tit. 34, Ch.
6, Pilots, Sec. 953 (1948); Mass. Annot. Laws, Tit. XV, Ch. 103, Secs. 23-25 (1862);
N.Y. Navigation Code, Ch. 37, Art. 6, Secs. 88, 89 (1941); Pa. Code, Tit. 55, Ch. 3,
Secs. 172, 173 (1927); S.Car. Code, Tit. 56, Sec. 1427 (1952).
11 Homer Ramsdell Transportation Co. v. La Compagnie, etc., 182 U.S. 406, 21 S.Ct.
831, 45 L.Ed. 1155 (1901); N.Y. Dock Co. v. N.Y. & Cuba Mail S.S. Co., 259 N.Y.
606, 182 N.E. 200 (1932).
12 City of Los Angeles v. Grace S.S. Co., 116 Cal.App. 237, 2 P.2d 401 (1931); Crisp
v. U.S. & Australasia S.S. Co., 124 F. 748 (S.D. N.Y. 1903); Harrison v. Hughes, 125
F. 869 (3d Cir. 1903); Homer Ramsdell Transportation Co. v. La Compagnie, supra
note 11; Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F.Supp. 184 (D. Ct. Md. 1965); Jure v. United Fruit
Co., 6 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1925); N.Y. Dock Co. v. N.Y. & Cuba Mail S.S. Co., supra note
11; The West Nohno, "29 F.2d 950 (S.D. N.Y. 1928).
13 4 Maule & S 77 (1815).
14 Supra note 12.
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portation Company v. La Compagnie Generale Trans-Atlantique.15 In
this case the Supreme Court of the United States held that the New
York pilotage law is compulsory because a pilot must be taken or an
equivalent fee paid. It pointed out that at common law there is a pre-
sumption that the master chooses his servant and gives him orders
which he is bound to obey. The court held that when the law has taken
the appointment of an individual out of the hands of the employer, the
necessary element of privity does not exist. Because the pilot is not an
agent of the shipowner, the shipowner cannot be liable for injury or
damage caused by the pilot's negligence in directing the movements of
the ship. The court clearly stated that the obligation of the master to
take the pilot was the essence of the basis for the nonliability. The de-
cision cites with approval Justice Story's Treatise on Agency in which
it is stated that if the master of the ship takes the pilot voluntarily, al-
though required to select from a particular class, then the master is
liable for the pilot's torts, but if he is taken compulsorily (bound to do
so under penalty) then the master is not liable.16
As a corollary, the pilot is personally liable for his torts. 17 Further-
more, the shipowner himself is liable where his own negligence rather
than that of the pilot is the proximate cause of the damage., The courts
strictly construe the compulsory aspects of these pilotage laws so that
if the shipowner elects to use a pilot in situations and areas not required
by the statute, then the pilot is considered as voluntarily employed and
his negligence is imputed to the shipowner. 19
Many courts in holding for the employer mentioned, but did not rely
upon, the shipowner's lack of control over the actions of the pilot. Since
the right to direct and control the performance of an alleged servant is
an essential element for the creation of a master-servant relationship, it
would seem that this lack of control alone would be sufficient grounds
for holding the shipowner not liable for the pilot's torts. However, the
courts have uniformly held that it is the statutory compulsion upon the
shipowner in his being required to take a pilot and his lack of selection
that precludes the forming of a master-servant relationship.
15 182 U.S. 406, 21 S.Ct. 831, 45 L.Ed. 1155 (1901).
16 Story, Agency, 456a (2d Ed.).
17 Matheson v. Norfolk & No. Am. S.S. Co., 73 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1934); Transportes
Maritimos v. Rotch, 289 F. 115 (D. Ct. Mass. 1923).
18 State Highway & Public Works Comm'n. v. Diamond S.S. Transp. Corp., 226 N.C.
371, 38 S.E.2d 214 (1946).
19 South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. United States, 78 F.Supp. 598 (E.D. S.C.
1948).
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Coal Mining Cases
States with coal mining operations have statutes regulating the op-
eration and safety of these mines.20 The typical statute provides in part
for the creation of a State Mining Board with authority to grant certifi-
cates of competency to certain overseers or persons of authority in the
mines and makes it unlawful for anyone to act in certain capacities in
mines without having obtained a certificate of competency.21 These
statutes also require that duly certified overseers (mine boss, foreman,
fire boss, etc.) must be employed in every mine and must perform nu-
merous specified duties.22 Some statutes expressly exempt the mine-
owner from liability fbr the mine foreman's negligence in carrying out
the duties required by statute, while other statutes expressly impose
strict liability upon him. 23
Numerous cases have arisen over the question of the mineowner's
liability for the injury or death of an employee, which resulted from the
negligence of a mine foreman that the mineowner was compelled to
hire. The earliest cases arose in Pennsylvania and West Virginia be-
ginning in approximately 1885.24 Cases from these and other states con-
tinued for some years thereafter.2  In most cases, the courts held in
favor of the mineowner either on grounds that the statute was repugnant
to the mineowner's constitutional rights2 or under the fellow servant
doctrine.2 7 Therefore, the courts did not come to grips with the issue of
compulsory employment.
In 1904, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Fulton v. Wilming-
ton Star Mining Company28 held that the Illinois Mining Act 29 did not
20 Ala. Code, Tit. 26, Sec. 166(4) (1940); Ark. Stat., Secs. 52-501 to 52-517 (1947); Ill.
Rev. Stat., Ch. 93, Secs. 8.01-8.18 (1953); Pa. Purdon's Stat., Tit. 52, Secs. 211-252,
841-858 (1927); Tenn. Code Anno., Ch. 4, Secs. 58-401 to 58-414 (1955); Va. Code of
1950, Tit. 45, Sees. 45-17 to 45-42; W.Va. Code of 1961, Ch. 22, Secs. 2396-2413.
21 Ibid.
22 Id.
23 Ill. Rev. Stat., supra note 20; Tenn. Code Anno., supra note 20; Va. Code, supra
note 20.
24 Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Carroll, 89 Pa. 374 (1879); Durkin v. Kingston
Coal Co., 171 Pa. 193, 33 A. 237 (1895); Keystone Bridge Co. v. Newberry, 96 Pa. 246
(1880); Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa. 432 (1878); Reese v. Biddle, 112 Pa.
72, 3 A. 813 (1886); Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. 42, 21 A. 157 (1891); Waddell v. Simo-
son, 112 Pa. 567, 4 A. 725 (1886); Williams v. Thacker Coal & Coke Co., 44 W.Va.
599, 30 S.E. 107 (1898).
25 Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. Alexander, 136 W.Va. 521, 66 S.E.2d 201 (1950); Musin
v. Pryor Coal Co., 68 Pa. Super. 88 (1914); Philadelphia & Reading Coal Co. v.
Kever, 4 F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1925); Strother v. U. S. Coal & Coke Co., 81 W.Va. 657,
95 S.E. 806 (1918).
26 Durkin v. Kingston Coal Co., supra note 24; Salt Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Priddy,
117 Tenn. 168, 96 S.W. 610 (1906).
27 Reese v. Biddle, supra note 24; Ross v. Walker, supra note 24; Waddell v. Simo-
son, supra note 24; Williams v. Thacker Coal Co., supra note 24.
28 133 F. 193 (7th Cir. 1904).
29 IMI. Laws of 1899, pp. 308, 309 & 7, 8.
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exempt mineowners from liability for the defaults of their mine fore-
men. They specifically distinguished the situation from the pilot laws
by stating that under the pilot laws the master was limited to employ-
ment of a specific individual, whereas under the mining laws the master
was limited only to selection of an individual from a class of people who
had obtained the requisite certificate of competency. The law only as-
sured competency, and within this area the mineowner was free to em-
ploy as he saw fit. This case was appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States, and the constitutionality of the statute was upheld.3 0
The court stated ihat such a statute did not deprive mineowners of
property without due process of law where it was not obligatory upon
the mineowner to select a particular individual or retain one if found
incompetent.
The next case addressing itself to the compulsory employment aspect
of these laws was Ducktown Sulphur, Copper, and Iron Company v.
Galloway.3 1 In this case the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the foreman whom the law required to be hired is deemed an employee
of the owner so that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies for in-
jury to miners by reason of the foreman's negligence, notwithstanding
that the owner must make a selection from a restricted choice. The
court in detail distinguished its decision from the Homer Ramsdell pilot
case3 2 by pointing out that the mineowner can make a choice, even
though restricted, and can discharge the mine foreman at any time
whereas the shipowner cannot.
Based on the above, it appears that the courts rejected the compul-
sory employment nonliability doctrine of the pilot cases in the mining
cases on the narrow factual ground that the mineowner was not com-
pelled to hire a specific individual, but only compelled to hire one in-
dividual from a restricted group who had been certified as competent
by a state board.
Labor Union Cases
Apart from the pilot and mining cases, there are few cases on the
question of compelled employee liability. The most interesting one is
Farmer v. Kearney.8 3 In this case the employer had yielded under pres-
sure of work stoppages to the union the function of selection and as-
signment of employees to unload ships. The union determined not only
who would work but also who would work which job. When the em-
ployee assigned to operate a derrick negligently injured another em-
30 Fulton v. Wilmington Star Mining Co., 205 U.S. 60, 27 S.Ct. 412, 51 L.Ed. 708
(1907).
31 262 Fed. 669 (6th Cir. 1920).
32 Homer Ramsdell v. La Compagnie, supra note 11.
33 115 La. 722, 39 So. 967 (1905).
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ployee, the injured employee brought an action against the employer.
The state supreme court held (1) that when workmen make it a con-
dition of their working that the employee yield to their union the right
of selection and supervision, they absolve such employer from his normal
responsibility, (2) that when the workmen delegate to a labor union
the right of selection and superintendence, the actions of the union and
its members are sufficient guaranty to them for their individual safety
and protection, and (3) that neither justice nor reason justifies throw-
ing responsibility upon the employer for acts over which the union and
its members have taken control. On these bases the court held the em-
ployer not liable. The comments from Lawyers' Reports Annotated on
this case are significant:
This decision, if sound, establishes a novel exception to the general
rule which holds the master liable for failure to exercise reasonable
care in the selection of competent employees ...
This seems to be the only reported case which has considered the
effect upon the master's duty and liability in these respects of the
practical restriction or destruction of this freedom of selection and
superintendence of employees by rules of a labor organization.
. . . in the Farmer case, the employer was not left free to select
from a class of persons, i.e., members of a union, but was practically
obliged to accept the individual selected by the union itself. This
fact limits the scope of this decision, and renders it inapplicable ...
upon the question whether the fact that an employer is restricted
in his choice to members of a labor union to which the injured
workman belonged, but not to a particular individual designated by
the union, will exonerate him from liability. . . . The difference ...
is one of degree only, but may be sufficient as the basis for a sound
distinction.8 4
The above comment as well as the decision in the two relevant mining
cases35 emphasizes the distinction between selection from a restricted
class of individuals and the master's requirement to take a specific in-
dividual, as in the pilot cases.
In two subsequent labor cases, the courts distinguished their holding
from Farmer v. Kearney.3 6 The first case involved a Missouri statute
which held an employer strictly liable to an employee injured due to
negligence of a fellow servant.37 The company contended that this statute
should not apply to their operation due to the fact that the employment
of fellow servants was by contract controlled and dictated by their labor
union. The court held that unless the company could prove duress of
property or of the person of the company's managing officer, the agree-
34 Annot., 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1105 (1906).
35 Fulton v. Wilmington, 133 F. 193 (7th Cir. 1904); Ducktown Sulphur v. Galloway,
262 F. 669 (6th Cir. 1920).
36 Supra note 33.
37 Hoover v. Western Coal & Mining Co., 142 S.W. 465 (Mo. 1911).
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ment with the union could not be used as a valid excuse for escaping
liability under the statute. The court specifically distinguished its hold-
ing from Farmer v. Kearney3" based on the facts.
In Worley v. Spreckels Brothers Commercial Company,39 the em-
ployer contended that because all of his workmen were compelled to be
union members he had relinquished his rights of selection and control
of their work and therefore could not be held liable for any employee's
injury caused by another employee's incompetence. The court did not
find sufficient impairment of the master's right to select competent
workmen and replace them for lack of ability to relieve him of liability
in failing to select a competent servant. The Farmer v. Kearney40 doc-
trine was again rejected due to the factual differences.
Statutes
A discussion of a master's liability for the tortious acts of his
servants would be incomplete without referring to the effect of certain
statutes upon this common law principle. The Workmen's Compensa-
tion Acts, which exist in all states, the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
the Jones Act, and others change the common law by eliminating the
defenses of fault, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and fellow
servant doctrine in instances of employee torts resulting in injury to
fellow employees. 41 These laws make the employer strictly liable for
injuries to employees within the scope of employment. Therefore, they
act to greatly narrow the cases that might otherwise arise on the ques-
tion of compelled employee liability.42 Consequently, for the purposes
of the summary below, only the effect upon the master's liability for
injury to third persons (nonemployees) resulting from the torts of a
servant whom he is compelled to hire may be considered.
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 contains a limited
ban on closed shop contracts, permits state right-to-work laws, and out-
laws certain types of featherbedding. As a result, instances when unions
can restrict or control an employer's hiring practices are reduced.43
38 Supra note 33.
39 163 Cal. 60, 124 P. 697 (1912).
40 Supra note 33.
41 Fleming, op. cit. supra note 2 at 470. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1 at 555.
42 1 Encyc. of Negligence 240 (1962); note, 3 Fla. L. Rev. 368-73 (1950).
43 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), Secs. 8(a) (3), 8(b) (6),
14(b), 61 Stat. 156 (1947).
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Case Law Summary
The factual situations in the cases referred to previously separate
into four categories:
1. A statute requires the employer to hire a specific individual or has
the same practical effect.
2. A statute requires employers to hire only individuals from a specific
designated class, but from which class they can freely select.
3. The employer through pressure from an organization such as a labor
union enters into a contract which gives that organization control
over the specific individuals who will be hired and on which jobs
they will be placed.
4. The employer through pressure from an organization such as a union
enters into a contract with that organization in which he agrees to
hire only from a particular class of individuals, but from which class
he can freely select and subsequently control their activity.
The first category above reflects the situation in the pilot cases.
44
It is settled case law that the master is not liable for pilot error.4 5
It has been said that the principle of the pilotage cases might be ap-
plied to compulsory hiring as under a labor union's featherbedding con-
tract.4 1 No sound analogy can be drawn between compulsory pilotage
by statutes and featherbedding by contract. The nonliability of the
master in the pilotage cases exists because there is statutory compulsion
to hire and complete loss of selection opportunity. 47 In featherbedding
the compulsion is by contract not statute. As discussed previously, this
difference is material. The master acts voluntarily on entering into the
contractual relationship, or he can void the contract based on duress,
whereas the master acts compulsorily under the pilotage statutes. In
featherbedding by contract, there is usually not complete usurping of
selection rights, since the employer hires from a class of individuals
(members of the union). Freedom to select from within a limited class
has been held not to be compulsory employment. 48 Therefore, due to
these substantial differences the pilotage doctrine cannot accurately be
extended to featherbedding by contract.
The second category restates the circumstances of the coal mining
cases. 49 In these cases the master's selection rights were restricted but
44 Supra note 12.
45 Ibid.
46 1 Encyc. of Negligence 749 (1962).
47 Supra note 12.
48 Ducktown v. Galloway, supra note 35; Fulton v. Wilmington, supra note 35;
Hoover v. Western, supra note 37; Worley v. Spreckels, supra note 39.
49 Supra notes 24 and 25.
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not removed, and he could freely select employees from a limited
qualifying group and could thereafter discharge them for incompetence.5 0
These decisions are sound law because the basic elements of a master-
servant relationship fundamentally remain intact.
The third category is the situation in Farmer v. Kearney.51 No other
case has been found which supports or agrees with its holding. Is
Farmer v. Kearney52 good law? It is not. If a master voluntarily dele-
gates his inherent rights of selection and control of workmen and con-
tracts with a labor organization to exercise these rights, he cannot cor-
rectly state that he is compelled to accept the specific employees which
the union then designates. The employment is not compulsory if it re-
sults from the terms of a voluntarily executed contract. Furthermore,
if such a contract is obtained through duress or undue coercion, the
employer can successfully bring an action to void it. 53 Therefore, in this
category the employer should still be liable for his employee's torts.
In the fourth category stated above, there is case law which holds
that the employer is liable for employee torts because he retains selec-
tion and control rights even though admittedly from a restricted group.
5 4
In addition, if duress is involved in consummating the contract the
employer may successfully void it.55 There is no sound reason why an
employer should not be liable for employee torts when such employees
were selected from a restricted group based upon the terms of a volun-
tary union agreement. No compulsion or substantial employment re-
striction exists in this circumstance.
Conclusion
The American and English Encyclopedia of Law states:
Where a person or corporation is compelled by law to employ an
individual in a given matter, no liability attaches for his tortious or
negligent act.5" (Italics supplied.)
Because the expanding of this principle to statutory compulsion to
hire from a class of individuals or to contractual compulsion exerted by
a union has been considered and rejected, it must be concluded that the
above statement remains a proper analysis of the law as it applies to
nonemployee injury or damage.
50 Supra note 35.
51 Supra note 33.
52 Ibid.
53 Cappy's Inc. v. Dorgan, 313 Mass. 170, 46 N.E.2d 538 (1943); Lafayette Dramatic
Productions v. Ferentz, 305 Mich. 193, 9 N.W.2d 57 (1943); Maisel v. Sigman, 123
Misc. 714, 205 N.Y. Supp. 807 (1924).
54 Fulton v. Wilmington, supra note 35; Ducktown Sulphur v. Galloway, supra
note 35.
55 Cappy's Inc. v. Dorgan, supra note 53; Lafayette v. Ferentz, supra note 53; Maisel
v. Sigman, supra note 53.
56 14 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law 809 (2d ed., 1896-1905).
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